J. Lucas Reddinger

  • Post-Doctoral Researcher
    Department of Economics
    Purdue University

I am an experimental labor economist with research in decision theory, health behavior, and social preferences. I earned a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California, Santa Barbara, in 2022.

Curriculum vita: Updated 2 December 2024
Email: reddinger@purdue.edu
JLR Portrait

Research

“On prior confidence and belief updating”

Abstract

We domiciliate a notion of confidence-in-priors in experimental updating tasks and propose a concomitant incentive-compatible design to measure the phenomenon. We then explore how confidence-in-priors affects subsequent updating, relative to the Bayesian benchmark. We manipulate confidence-in-priors by varying the duration for which subjects view the objective prior. We find that subjects generally under-update. However, subjects in our low confidence treatment under-update to a lesser extent and place less weight on their priors when updating. We attribute differences across our confidence treatments to non-Bayesian updating patterns.

“Temptation: Immediacy and certainty”

Abstract

Is an option especially tempting when it is both immediate and certain? I test the effect of risk on the present-bias factor given quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In my experiment workers allocate about thirty to fifty minutes of real-effort tasks between two weeks. I study dynamic consistency by comparing choices made two days in advance of the workday with choices made when work is imminent. My novel design permits estimation of present bias using a decision with a consequence that is both immediate and certain. I find greater present bias when the consequence is certain. This finding has implications for any economic decision involving a present-biased decision-maker, including labor contracting and consumer good pricing. I offer a methodological remedy for experimental economists.

“Vaccination as personal public-good provision”

Highlights

Abstract

Vaccination against infectious diseases has both private and public benefits. We study whether social preferences—concerns for the well-being of other people—are associated with one's decision regarding vaccination. We measure these social preferences for 549 online subjects with a public-good game and an altruism game. To the extent that one gets vaccinated out of concern for the health of others, contribution in the public-good game is analogous to an individual's decision to obtain vaccination, while our altruism game provides a different measure of altruism, equity, and efficiency concerns. We proxy vaccine demand with how quickly a representative individual voluntarily took the initial vaccination for COVID-19 (after the vaccine was widely available). We collect COVID-19 vaccination history separately from the games to avoid experimenter-demand effects. We find a strong result: Contribution in the public-good game is associated with greater demand to voluntarily receive a first dose, and thus also to vaccinate earlier. Compared to a subject who contributes nothing, one who contributes the maximum ($4) is 58% more likely to obtain a first dose voluntarily in the four-month period that we study (April through August 2021). In short, people who are more pro-social are more likely to take a voluntary COVID-19 vaccination. Behavior in our altruism game does not predict vaccination. We recommend further research on the use of pro-social preferences to help motivate individuals to vaccinate for other transmissible diseases, such as the flu and HPV.

“Can theories of social identity help increase uptake of a COVID-19 vaccine? A randomized trial”

Highlights

Abstract

Widespread vaccination is certainly a critical element in successfully fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. We apply theories of social identity to design targeted messaging to reduce vaccine hesitancy among groups with low vaccine uptake, such as African Americans and political conservatives. We conducted an online experiment from April 7 to 27, 2021, that oversampled Black, Latinx, conservative, and religious U.S. residents. We first solicited the vaccination status of over 10,000 individuals. Of the 4,609 individuals who reported being unvaccinated, 4,190 enrolled in our covariate-adaptive randomized trial. We provided participants messages that presented the health risks of COVID-19 to oneself and others; they also received messages about the benefits of a COVID-19 vaccine and an endorsement by a celebrity. Messages were randomly tailored to each participant’s identities—Black, Latinx, conservative, religious, or being a parent. Respondents reported their intent to obtain the vaccine for oneself and, if a parent, for one’s child. We report results for the 2,621 unvaccinated respondents who passed an incentivized manipulation check. We find no support for the hypothesis that customized messages or endorsers reduce vaccine hesitancy among our segments. A post hoc analysis finds evidence that a vaccine endorsement from Dr. Fauci reduces stated intent to vaccinate among conservatives. We find no evidence that tailoring public-health communication regarding COVID-19 vaccination for broad demographic groups would increase its effectiveness. We recommend further research on communicators and endorsers, as well as incentives.

Reviews

“Non-financial motivation in the workplace”

We discuss non-financial motivations that have been found to affect worker responses in experimental labor environments.

“Wage policies, incentive schemes, and motivation”

We review experimental and field evidence of how effort and performance in the labor market is affected by financial incentives and non-monetary motivators. Especially small incentives may crowd-out intrinsic motivation, while large incentives may cause choking. A wide variety of social preferences affect labor supply, including gift exchange, fairness, and reciprocity.

Research in progress

“Beliefs and preferences regarding risk and ambiguity”

Abstract

Theory predicts ambiguity to ebb with repeated draws from a fixed probability distribution. We design an experiment with measurement of beliefs about the distribution in addition to measurement of revealed preferences over risk and ambiguity. We analyze the belief-updating process and test for well-known biases. We then use a variety of treatments to test the relevance of specific mechanisms: variation in ambiguity regarding the distribution, and direct- versus strategy-method behavior given uncertainty. Given these insights, we compare and discuss two popular tasks used in economics and psychology.

“Cooperation with dynamic investment”

“Simple tests of the resource model of self-control”

“Discouragement in the rational attention model”

Cows at pasture in Santa Ynez valley, on Ektar film.
Cows at pasture in Santa Ynez valley, on Ektar film.

About me

I was born and raised in Wyoming and Montana. Some of my favorite places include the Beartooth and Bighorn Mountains, and the entire Absaroka region—all in the vicinity of Yellowstone National Park, which my family simply called “the park.” I studied philosophy, economics, and mathematics as an undergraduate at Montana State University in Bozeman.

I independently learned about web engineering (various programming languages, database systems, and operating systems) in my younger years. I took a challenging and rewarding web development contract with a start-up after my undergraduate program. Once I completed my Master’s degree in economics at Montana State University in Bozeman, I worked full-time as a professional software engineer. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to return to academia and obtain my Ph.D. in economics at the University of California at Santa Barbara, where my favorite pastime was reading economics articles at the beach.

Beyond the requisite hiking and backpacking, I enjoy bouldering, running, and skiing when the opportunity affords. I indent code with four spaces in Vim; I grew up on (and still use) OpenBSD and FreeBSD.